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Grubbs: The Story of Florida's Migrant Farm Workers

THE STORY OF FLORIDA’S MIGRANT
FARM WORKERS
by D ONALD H. GRUBBS

T

HE VACATION - BOUND tourist en route to South Florida often
follows highway AIA past the glittering motels, mile on mile,
that dot the beaches of Florida’s Gold Coast, or chooses perhaps
to drive along the flowing curves of the Sunshine State Parkway
farther inland. There is a third route south to Miami, however,
that is quite dissimilar from the better known pair; it is a highway of many repairs that is used principally by far less affluent
travelers. The motorist who bumps along U. S. 441 sees limitless
flat vistas of fertile ebony soil stretching out to the horizon, striped
with unwavering thick bars of rich green: beans, cabbage, celery,
or potatoes for the nation’s tables. Occasionally stretches of barbed
wire enclose herds of Brahma cattle, and here and there are
patches of incongruity in the prosperous panorama - hundreds
of yards of highway frontage where filthy hovels nestle among
ragweed and waste paper. Though these dilapidated shacks resemble inferior chicken coops more than anything else, none
shelter livestock; the farmers of Florida are too progressive to
allow cattle or poultry to be kept in such surroundings. No, these
hovels are the winter residences of human beings. Winter homes
only, because the unfortunates who live in them, along with
their more fortunate co-workers who occupy more decent housing
around Lake Okeechobee, are as vital in the summer to the
economies of states farther north as they are in the winter to the
economy of Florida. They are agricultural migrants, members of a
ragged army of part-time Floridians that for the better part of the
twentieth century have been toiling north with the sun every
spring, filling the harvest needs of growers whose produce would
rot and be plowed under without the migrants’ labor.
The Florida-based migrant stream, unlike those in other
parts of the nation, is made up almost entirely of Negroes, and
has been organized since the beginning into crews headed by
crew leaders or labor contractors. The migrants in the stream
furnish only a small percentage of the total man-days of farm
labor needed on the Atlantic coast, but that portion comes at the
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most crucial period in agriculture, the harvest. This operation
eclipses in importance all that goes before, because it determines
the extent of profit or loss; 1 and so great are harvest labor requirements that this labor must necessarily come from the migrant
stream. “For large-scale production you couldn’t harvest without
them,” flatly states A. M. Larrimore of Florida’s Farm Placement
Service. 2
How did this important group come to be an integral part
of Florida’s agriculture? To find the answer we must go back
before the turn of the twentieth century, to New Jersey in the
1890’s, where seasonal harvest labor began to be used heavily
for the first time on the Atlantic coast. Unskilled Italian immigrants from Philadelphia, with a few Poles from Baltimore,
supplied the needed manpower. Some Negroes from Virginia,
Maryland, and North Carolina also began moving into states farther north about this time to augment their low income with harvest earnings, 3 and more and more they came to be the predominant element in the stream. After World War I, many farming
areas on the eastern seaboard began to outgrow the local supply of
labor, tapping the large supply of unskilled Negro labor in Southern cities as a consequence. This situation was particularly characteristic of the region around Norfolk, where labor was so cheap
and plentiful that some have credited its presence with furnishing
the chief impetus for the growth of large-scale truck farming
on the fertile Virginia lowlands. 4 The Farm Placement Service
gives 1921 as the date when the Atlantic coast migration assumed a definite pattern; in the early 1920’s the migration
began in late spring in the Carolinas and concluded in New
York or New England the following fall. 5
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

“Migratory Labor on the Eastern Seaboard,” Labor Market and Employment Security, May, 1953, 8; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare, Hearings on Migratory Labor, 82nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1 9 5 2 , P t . 2 , p . 9 7 0 ; R . L . M i g h e l l , A m e r i c a n
Agriculture: Its Structure and Place in the Economy (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1950), 148. The Senate hearings mentioned
above will be cited hereafter as Migratory Labor Hearings.
Interview with A. M. Larrimore, Assistant Chief of Farm Placement,
Florida Farm Placement Service, June 18, 1959.
Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the United States (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1945), 39-40, 46-47.
Ibid., p. 37, 38; S. E. Greene, The Education of Migrant Children
National Council of Agricultural Life and Labor,
(Washington:
1954), 26.
H. R. Padgett, “Florida’s Migratory Worker,” Rural Sociology, XVIII
(September, 1953), 268; U. S. Department of Labor, Farm Place-
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Even then it was recognized that Florida would be the logical
place to begin the itinerary, allowing the migrants to obtain
more work by starting earlier in the year. But the stubborn South
Florida soil refused to yield adequate crops until after 1928,
when the Everglades Experiment Station discovered that the
addition of copper sulphate would permit bumper crops to be
raised from the sticky black soil. From the very beginning, however, only the large-scale entrepreneur could afford the capital
outlay for irrigation, drainage, and specialized equipment. Accordingly, the Belle Glade-Pahokee region quickly became characterized by huge landholdings, rich yields of specialized crops,
and thousands of migrant workers. 6 About the same time,
Virginia and Maryland agriculture shifted from a labor supply
to a labor demand situation, creating a peak demand in early
spring when the Florida harvest was ending. With the Florida
workers thus drawn northward, the Atlantic stream assumed
7
substantially its present form. But it was not simply the opening
of the Everglades that caused the great expansion of the migrant
stream in the 1920’s. The American people began to demand
more and more fruits and vegetables in their diet after transportation and refrigeration were perfected sufficiently to supply
them; these crops were those which the Atlantic seaboard, and
Florida in particular, could supply. 8
But where were the many additional migrant laborers to
come from? The spread of the Dust Bowl and the boll weevil,
ment Service, Labor Recruitment for Agriculture: The Farm Placement
Service,
1949-1951
(Washington:
Department
of
Labor,
1952), 4; Schwartz, op. cit., 48.
Louis Persh, “An Analysis of the Agricultural Migratory Movements
on the Atlantic Seaboard” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, Washington, D.C., June, 1953), 68; U.S. Congress,
House, Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate Migration of
Destitute Citizens, Hearings, 76th Cong., 3rd Sess., 1940, Pt. 2,
p. 584; Greene, op. cit., 16; Schwartz, op. cit., 48-50. The hearings
of the Select Committee mentioned above will be cited hereafter as
Interstate Migration Hearings.
W. H. Metzler, Migratory Farm Workers in the Atlantic Coast
Stream: A Study in the Belle Glade Area of Florida, Department of
Agriculture Circular 966 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1955), 3; Earl L. Koos, They Follow the Sun (Jacksonville, Fla.:
State Board of Health, 1957), 2.
Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 249; Schwartz, op. cit., 5152; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
Special Subcommittee on Cotton, Hearings, Study of Agricultural and
Economic Problems of the Cotton Belt, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947,
p. 739. These hearings will be cited hereafter as Cotton Hearings.
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and the coming of the Great Depression to the rural South answered that problem by driving thousands of sharecroppers off
their tiny plots. Some went north to swell the total of urban
unemployed, some packed into the shacks of Southern “niggertowns,” and some rode or walked to Florida to join the migrant
stream. 9 It is hard to say how many of these unfortunates there
were. Only in a few areas could reasonable estimates even be
made. One writer on the subject arrived at his totals by asking
farmers and county agricultural agents whether they numbered
the migrants “by the score, hundreds, or thousands.” Because of
the growing lack of transportation, there was a decline in the
distance traveled by the average migrant, and there may even
have been a decline in the number of those who actually went
from state to state; the important fact, however, was the great increase in the numbers who overflowed the large farms of the Atlantic seaboard where the migrants were employed, the surplus of
labor driving down wages and living conditions. 10
Reliable and systematically collected data concerning the
migrants’ wage rates are almost non-existent for the period prior
to the Second World War, but close estimates can be found from
time to time in the pages of various Congressional hearings. The
highest paid migrants, who had earned about forty cents an hour
before the depression, now earned about twenty-five cents, when
they could find work. The average daily farm wage rate in the
South Atlantic states in 1933 was eighty-four cents, and the
labor of an entire migrant family brought an average $300-$400
over the course of a year. Some years later, witnesses at the Cotton
Hearings recalled that for migrants during the depression “family
earnings often did not cover the cost of migration, and often
could not he stretched across periods of unemployment . . .
9. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 970; Henry Hill Collins, America’s Own Refugees: Our 4,000,000 Homeless Migrants (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1941), 8, 15-17; Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 2, pp. 627-628.
10. U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee to Investigate the Interstate
Migration of Destitute Citizens, Interstate Migration, House Report
No. 369, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1940, pp. 337-339; Paul S. Taylor,
“Migratory Farm Labor in the United States,” Monthly Labor Review,
XLIV (March, 1937), 543; C. W. E. Pittman, “Migratory Agricultural Workers on the Atlantic Seaboard,” Employment Security
Review, (June, 1940), 5. The report of the Congressional committee mentioned above will be cited hereafter as Interstate Migration
Report.
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relief to meet such emergencies was practically never available.” 11
Housing for the migrants was similarly at a low point during
the gray years of the depression. In the Belle Glade area migrants
were charged rent of four to six dollars monthly for the right to
camp on the land of the farmer who employed them, while the
facilities for which they paid three or four dollars a week-most
of their earnings-were as follows, according to A. F. Smith,
then of the Florida Industrial Commission:
The migrant workers must sleep in shacks, boxes, in
cars, tents, or trailers, in trucks, on the ground, or wherever
it is possible to rest. They have no facilities for washing and
no toilet facilities of any kind are provided. . . . Sanitary
and living conditions found this spring in the Lake Okeechobee area were beyond description. 12
During the depression only two states on the Atlantic seaboard had housing regulations applicable to migrant camps; in
Florida local boards of health had vague “authority to proceed”
against the most flagrant abuses. Such a hazy grant of power was
seldom used, and health conditions were deplorable. Much illness
among migrants could be traced to the necessity of living where
“indescribably filthy” open-pit toilets were located next to the
only water supply, or in it, and where a child’s typical meal,
according to witnesses, consisted of a cold corn cob, tomato,
three dried prunes, and beer. The health officer of Palm Beach
County reported that as late as 1938 “I saw 21 sick children with
acute dysentery in a camp under very unsanitary conditions and
I recommended to the State Board of Health that they should
close the place, and they have not closed it to this day [1940].”
A spokesman for the Florida Industrial Commission, speaking
in regard to relief aid, summed up a situation which had characterized the entire decade of the 1930’s:
In some instances a minimum amount of food is provided,
usually one meal . . . and then only if the person faces starvation. . . . When the crops were frozen in January of this
year, thousands of migrants were stranded and faced virtual
starvation. 13
11. Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 77; Pt. 2, pp. 487, 536, 598;
Interstate Migration Report, 327; Cotton Hearings, 743.
12. Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 2, pp. 486, 538-539, 599; Collins,
op. cit., 252.
13. Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 217, 305-306; Pt. 2,
pp.
487, 494, 538, 555, 597; M. H. Martensen, “Care for Migrants’
Children,” Survey, LXXX (May, 1944), 153.
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Throughout the depression years the United States Public
Health Service was the only agency giving really effective aid
to the migrants, but in 1941 one of the many economy-minded
Congresses with which this nation has been blessed cut the
meager funds of the Public Health Service, leaving migrants
dependent on individual charity. Even before this event a reputable and sober investigator had concluded that “chances for
continued survival are so bad among transients that as a group
they would gradually be destroyed, were their ranks not constantly augmented. 14
In the late thirties the Farm Security Agency began programs
in health and housing, culminating during the war years, which
were to prove of great benefit for the migrant worker. The F.S.A.
did what it could to alleviate the atrociously unsanitary conditions
around the migrant camps, until in June of 1942 the War Manpower Commission directed the Secretary of Agriculture to see
that transportation and health services were provided to the
migrants wherever needed. One of the results of the new Federal
prodding was the setting up of a Migratory Labor Hospital at
Belle Glade. 15 Few of the meliorative actions of the F.S.A.,
however, were more striking and more valuable than its housing
program. Its first camp was opened in 1940, also at Belle Glade.
More followed; 16 much of the more presentable housing one sees
around Lake Okeechobee today - 1961 - dates from the wartime
program of the F.S.A. Indeed, it was during this period in the
early 1940’s that the Great Depression finally came to an end
for the migrants of Florida. The war brought a number of improvements. Where there had been chaos in their labor market,
the war brought planning; where there had been a wage-stifling
oversupply of labor, the excess workers quickly vanished to distant
shipyards and defense construction. Offshore labor - Jamaicans,
Puerto Ricans, Bahamians, and others - appeared; so great was the
turnover that the postwar migrants were to be an almost com14. Collins, op. cit:, 251; U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, Hearings, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1941, Pt. 14, pp. 5652-5653.
15. W. D. Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency Farm Labor Supply
Program, 1943-1947, Department of Agriculture Monograph 13
(Washington: Department of Agriculture, 1951), 24; “Children in
the Everglades,” The Child, XI (December, 1946), 99.
16. Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 2, pp. 519, 585-586; Rasmussen,
op. cit., 11; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 711; Pt. 2, p. 1061;
“Children in the Everglades,” loc. cit., 100.
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pletely different group from the prewar workers. Of all the developments during the war years, the growth of an effective
system of labor placement was probably the most important.
There had been a Farm Labor Division in the old Employment
Service of the Department of Labor during World War I, but
with the war’s end it passed out of existence. The Wagner-Peyser
Act of 1933 had provided for a farm placement system within
the United States Employment Service, but little was done under
the provisions of this law until in 1939 the Employment Service
was transferred from the Department of Labor to the Federal
Security Administration, and thence to the War Manpower
Commission in 1942. 17 Meanwhile, the F.S.A. continued to
carry on its welfare programs in conjunction with the rest of the
migrant program.
Then in early 1943 hearings began on a bill, House Joint
Resolution 96, to provide for a wartime program of migrant
labor allocation - and incidentally to cut further appropriations
for the F.S.A., thereby ending its part in the labor program.
Representatives of the United States Employment Service, under
which the F.S.A. carried on its activities, were not even invited
to testify at the hearings. Instead, the center of the stage was
occupied by the National Farm Bureau Federation, which announced, “We insist . . . that all unworkable, hampering restrictions . . . the fixing of minimum wages . . . hours . . . housing
standards, unionization of workers be immediately discontinued.”
They followed this demand with a second one: that the entire
farm labor program be turned over to the various state farm
Extension Services. In view of the fact that the Extension Service
in each state bore a direct and official relationship to the Farm
Bureau of that state, and was substantially controlled by it, this
suggestion was much as though the National Association of Manufacturers had demanded sole control of the National Labor Relations Board. Even the National Grange and the California
Fruit Growers Exchange, similarly composed of employers of farm
labor, couldn’t stomach this second proposition of the Farm
Bureau’s, and on it they parted company with their previous
17. Rasmussen, 32-33, 87; U.S., Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, Backgrounds of the War Farm Labor Program (Washington: Department of Agriculture, 1942), 4; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 708-832; Pt. 2, pp. 1005-1010.
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comrades. 18 But the Farm Bureau’s proposals were a part of the
bill when it reached the floor of Congress, where an amendment
was added to prohibit Federal labor recruiters from acquainting
sharecroppers with possible better opportunities in the migrant
stream - that is, unless the recruiters first received permission
from the local county agent of the Extension Service. 19 No attack
of any sort was made on the bill until it reached the Senate,
where Richard Russell of Georgia took charge of the attempt to
pass it. Russell told his colleagues that “shelter” for the workers
could still be provided, but that the F.S.A. had been “seizing
upon the movement of agricultural migratory labor as the occasion
to bring about . . . some form of social reform” and had “acted
in a very arbitrary manner . . . it had required housing conditions
which were far superior to any that heretofore existed. . . . Someone had suggested that the Farm Security Administration was
organizing unions of farm laborers, . . . imposing certain reforms
and certain ideas,” and so on. 20 Russell had already admitted
that “as far as the farm organizations are concerned, and particularly the Farm Bureau Federation, the pending joint resolution
embraces more of their ideas than mine . . . it is more of a
Farm Bureau measure than anything else.” 21 But the nation had
to have a farm program for the war effort, whether that program
be drawn up by Congress or by a private association, and so the
bill passed and became Public Law 45. Control of the program
passed to the War Foods Administration and, in its local aspects,
to the State Extension Services. For some years afterward the
Farm Placement Service was allowed to work only with the condition that it was “not to alter in any significant degree the en18. U.S., Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX,
Pt. 3, p. 3111; Rasmussen, op. cit., 42-44; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 708.
19. Rasmussen, op. cit., 44-46; Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Pt. 3, pp. 3107, 3438, 3441-3443.
20. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943, LXXXIX, Pt. 3,
pp. 3438, 3440, 3464-3465.
21. Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st Sess., 1943 LXXXIX, Pt. 3,
p. 3111. For a somewhat more detailed look at the Farm Bureau’s
influence over the wartime program see Donald H. Grubbs, “A History of the Atlantic Coast Stream of Agricultural Migrants” (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Florida, Gainesville, August 1959),
21-29; for an excellently written, full length account of the Farm
Bureau and its control over farm labor legislation see Grant McConnell, The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley, Calif.:
University of California Press, 1953), especially 92-95, 165, 171,
181.
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vironment in which decisions and actions of farm employers and
migratory farm workers are made.” 22
One of the major reasons for the dominance of the Farm
Bureau’s viewpoint was the pressure of the war effort and the
consequent need for high food production. The unusual demands
of war no longer existed, however, when a bill for the extension
of the Farm Bureau’s wartime program through mid-1948 was
presented in Congress in 1947. Opposing this proposed continuation were the state Employment Services, the Department of
Labor, and various public and labor groups. As first drawn up
for consideration in the hearings, the bill represented the last
public appearance of the farm bloc’s primitive labor philosophy
as proposed Federal Legislation: Section 5 of the bill provided,
as Section 4(a) of the wartime program similarly had stated,
that “No funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended
directly or indirectly to fix, regulate, impose, or enforce collective-bargaining requirements, wage rates, housing standards,
hours of work, or union membership with respect to agricultural
workers.” The bill also provided that the housing projects set up
by the F.S.A, could be disposed of only to growers or growers’
cooperatives. It became obvious in the course of the hearings
that the farm bloc was alone in supporting the bill against a
wide assortment of organizations such as those mentioned above.
Nevertheless, most of Florida’s Congressional delegation, including
Senator-to-be George Smathers, backed the growers. 23 The Farm
Bureau and its allies were defeated, however, for when the bill
emerged from committee it was shorn of the welfare prohibition,
allowed the F.S.A. camps to be turned over to public or private
groups such as the present Housing Authorities in Belle Glade
and Pahokee, and extended the wartime program only through
the end of 1947. In that form the bill was passed. 24
Pursuant to the 1947 law and the earlier Wagner-Peyser
Act, the Farm Placement Service reverted to the Department of
Labor’s Employment Service and the state Employment Services
22. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 708-710; Pt. 2, p. 1013.
23. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Permanent Farm Labor Program, Hearings on S. 1334, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., 1947. See especially 1-3, 49. See also Rasmussen, op. cit.,
53-54; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 303; H. Hasiwar, “The
Corporate Farmer: Agriculture’s Newest Blight,” New Leader, January 21, 1952, 15-18.
24. Rasmussen, op. cit., pp. 55-56,
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on the first day of 1948. Most of the Farm Placement personnel
had gained valuable experience under the wartime program, and
the new system was soon working quite smoothly. Since then, as
a spokesman for Florida’s Farm Placement Service recently said,
“I don’t think there’s any question that there’s been improvement
over the World War II program.” One of the reasons for that
improvement was the shift in the philosophy behind the placement of migrant workers. Basically, the Extension Services had
taken a “hands off” attitude: growers and workers were supposed
to make their own arrangements and “the Extension Service was
to help only after their efforts had failed.” 25 The Farm Placement Service attempted to be more constructive. In the first two
years it administered the program, many improvements in planning and contact with the migrants’ crew leaders were made.
This new utilization and attempted control of the crew leaders
(or labor contractors) eventually became one of the most praiseworthy accomplishments of the Service.
Before World War II the labor contractor-crew leader system
had been spoken of as “quite damnable . . . a sort of contract
system, a peonage system.” Basically, this was due to the concept
of the labor contractor’s function: he was to provide the grower
with enough Negro labor-units to assure him of absolute ability
to harvest when and to what degree needed. The contractor’s
rate of pay often was by the head; consequently, telling his listeners of the distant Promised Land of fruitful harvest, he would
cram as many labor-units aboard his truck as possible. Usually his
truckload of human cattle arrived well in advance of the harvest
-he was paid to have it on hand and ready-and he could tally
up a lucrative amount of debt, plus interest and any other fees
he cared to charge, as he advanced money to his labor-units to
keep them from starving. As a middleman, he could play the
farmer against the labor-units, charging first the farmer and
then the Negro migrants for the cost of transportation, or paying
25. U.S., Federal Security Agency, Farm Placement Service, Labor Recruitment for Agriculture: The Farm Placement Service in 1948
(Washington: Federal Security Agency, 1948), 4; A. E. Meyer,
“Migrant Labor,” a series, Washington Post, October 6, 1947, pp. 1,
9; October 7, 1947, p. 11; October 12, 1947, p. 8M; Interview with
A. M. Larrimore, Florida Farm Placement Service, June 18, 1959;
C.W.E. Pittman, The Atlantic Coast Migratory Movement of Agricultural Workers - War Years (Washington: Department of Agriculture, 1946), 13.
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the workers a pittance after telling the farmer how much money
“his niggers” were demanding for wages. The difference, of
course, lined the contractor’s pocket. Still another business opportunity presented itself to the enterprising crew leader: the
rural absence of recreational facilities and the emotional tension
built up by long, arduous monotony in the fields practically
invited a gambling and prostitution racket. Usually the labor contractor was only too happy to provide this. As late as 1951 some
of these human vultures were found to be clearing $10,000 a
year. 26 But throughout the fifties the Farm Placement Service
gradually gained enough domination of the labor market so that
they could begin to refuse employment to the more unscrupulous
contractors. Even today, however, the problem still exists, though
greatly reduced.
In the early 1950's dealings with the better crew leaders
expanded into the “Annual Worker Plan,” a scheme for regularizing and giving greater length and continuity to the employment of the migrants. The plan, as it operated throughout the
fifties, began with collection by the various Atlantic coast state
Placement Services of the requests for labor for the coming
harvest. Representatives of these Services then traveled to Florida to contact the migrants’ crew leaders, scheduling their labor
commitments for the coming season on a Migratory Labor Employment Record. In addition to this pre-season scheduling
phase, in-season guidance was maintained to meet changes due to
weather or crop failure. So quickly did this system prove its
effectiveness that it was adopted in the nation’s other migrant
streams in 1954. 27 Among the other outstanding acomplishments
of the Service were the establishment of information stations and
rest stops, and the development of techniques to aid the efficient
26.
27.

Interstate Migration Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 314, 381, 385; Pt. 2, p.
487; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 649; Pt. 2, p. 1027;
Metzler, op. cit., 56.
Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 2, pp. 1015, 1028-1033; Metzler,
op. cit., 56; P. R. Rieley, “Guiding Migratory Workers on the Eastern Seaboard,” Employment Security Review, XX (March, 1953),
7-8; “Migratory Labor on the Eastern Seaboard,” Labor Market and
Employment Security, May, 1953, 11-12; Don Larin, “Annual Work
Plans for Agricultural Migrants,” Employment Security Review,
XXII (March, 1955), 3-4; Interview with W. F. Cole, Jr., Assistant
Chief of Farm Placement, Florida Farm Placement Service, Janua r y 2 4 , 1 9 6 1 ; U . S . , P r e s i d e n t ’s C o m m i t t e e o n M i g r a t o r y L a b o r ,
[Second] Report to the President on Domestic Migratory Labor
(Washington: Department of Labor, 1960), 11-12.
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placement of the newly-arrived Puerto Rican workers of South
Florida and the non-resident incoming citrus workers. Unlike
the Negro migrants around Lake Okeechobee, neither of these
groups, as a rule, were organized into crews, had group transportation, or were Florida residents. 28
The Placement Service was dealing with a group that built up
to a numerical peak about 1949 and then slowly declined in
number. In 1946 there were around 20,000-25,000 workers in
the Florida-based migrant stream; but with the return of war
veterans, economic displacement, and legal and illegal immigration of foreign workers, the stream swelled to a wage-depressing
total of about 58,000 in 1949. The migrants numbered over
50,000 until after 1954. But a trend was evident; though the decline was spotty and irregular, harvest mechanization, growing employment opportunities outside of agriculture, and the smaller
number of foreign workers explain the fact that only 28,00030,000 migrants could be found working in the stream at the outset of the 1960’s. 29 The changing size of the stream is important
because the migrant’s wage has been remarkably proportional to it,
rising when the total number of workers has fallen. During the
decade of the 1950’s the migrant’s daily wage increased from
about five to sometimes. eight dollars, his average yearly income
from the $500 to the $1000 range. An average annual income
per household of $1,733 was reached in 1955, according to
one study of Belle Glade migrants. 30
After the 1947 law which put the Farm Placement Service
back under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor’s Employment Services, the next significant legal victory for the
28. Metzler, op. cit., 5; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 830, 833;
Pt. 2, p. 1012; Rieley, p. 11; U.S., Department of Labor, Farm
Placement Service, Labor Recruitment for Agriculture: The Farm
Placement Service, 1949-1951 (Washington: Department of Labor,
1952), 11; Interview with A. M. Larrimore, Florida Farm Placement Service, June 18, 1959.
29. Padgett, loc. cit., 2 6 8 ; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 2, p. 967;
Metzler, op. cit., 5; Persh, op. cit., 54-55; Koos, op. cit., 5; Florida
Industrial Commission, Farm Placement Service, “Pooled Interviews
of Migratory Agricultural Workers,” Farm Labor Bulletins (mimeographed), May 6, 1958; May 7, 1959; April 11-23, 1960.
30. Metzler, op. cit., 2; U.S., Department of Agriculture, Bureau of
Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Marketing Service, Farm Labor
and Wages Report, 1959 (Washington: Department of Agriculture,
1959); U.S., Department of Agriculture, Reports of the Secretary
of Agriculture, 1951-1959 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951-1959); Koos, op. cit., 34.
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migrants came in 1949 when the Federal government, by amendment to the Child Labor Act, prohibited the employment of migrant children under sixteen when schools were in session. Although highly significant as a declaration of eventual policy, the
law was often evaded. Among the clever devices for evasian
were closing the schools, operating them late at night so they
would not be “in session” during the day, and paying the father
for the entire family’s labor so the claim could be made that the
children were working for their father, and were thus exempt
under terms of the law. 31 In 1952 Senators Paul Douglas of
Illinois and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota attempted to follow
up the law by securing a Congressional appropriation of $181,000 for migrant education - it had been estimated that $10,000,000 would be required - but a Congress which set aside
$6,000,000 for migratory birds and another large sum for fighting hoof-and-mouth disease turned the request down. Humphrey
was philosophic. “We have to take care of the beef supply.
Humans? Well, they, no. God provides them,” he said. 32 Despite
such defeats, educational opportunities for the children of
Florida’s migrants continued to increase during the decade of the
1950’s, albeit slowly and unevenly. One Florida study found
that 90 per cent of migrant children in the compulsory schooling
age range were actually in school; on the other hand, a later
study found 25 per cent of the children from 5 to 14 years old
not in attendance. Even the most optimistic reports granted that
practically all migrant children must drop out of school after
their sixteenth birthday. 33
In 1950 another of the goals for the relief of the migrants’
condition was reached when farm labor was admitted to the
coverage of the Social Security Act. At first, coverage was limited
to workers who labored more than sixty days for one employer,
leaving most migrants still unprotected. But within the next few
years the American Public Welfare Association, the National
Education Association’s Department of Rural Education, the
31. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 11, 639, 644; Greene, op. cit.,
54; “3,465 Children Found Illegally at Work on Farms in 1951,”
Labor Information Bulletin, XIX (January, 1952), 6-7.
32. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 187, 441, 757, 785.
33. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 751-753; Greene, op. cit., 53;
Koos, op. cit., 16-17; Metzler, op. cit., 14; Jules Berman, “Services
for Migratory Agricultural Workers,” Social Security Bulletin, XVII
(November, 1954), 11.

Published by STARS, 1961

13

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 40 [1961], No. 2, Art. 2
116

F LORIDA H ISTORICAL Q UARTERLY

American Public Health Association, and a host of other organizations pushed for increased coverage. Finally, under 1954 and
1956 amendments, any migrant working for the same crew
leader longer than twenty days was allowed to qualify. But the
enforcement of these provisions was to be another matter.
Many of the growers concerned were militantly opposed to the
idea of complying with such “Federal interference;” as one
Florida farmer told an interviewer, “If you think I’m going to
pay these niggers for working, and then pay social security to the
government, too, you’re crazy.” 34
The most important developments of the early 1950’s followed the appearance in 1951 of the report of the President’s
Commission on Migratory Labor. Appointed by President Truman
at the suggestion of Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin, the
commission was made up of five farm labor experts of varying
background and had as its executive secretary Varden Fuller, the
University of California’s authority on agricultural economics.
The recommendations in the commission’s report were unanimous : “In no sense was it a compromise,” one of the members
of the commission reported later. The report called for a Federal
Committee on Migratory Farm Labor and urged coverage of migrants under minimum wage, unemployment compensation, and
even collective bargaining protection. Most public and newspaper
comment on the findings and recommendations was favorable. 35
The subsequent encounter in Congress centered around a bill
sponsored by Lousiana’s Senator Allen Ellender and Texas’ Representative William Poage for extension of the program to import
foreign contract labor. Shortly after the bill was presented in the
Senate, Paul Douglas of Illinois arose to offer several amendments embodying many of the recommendations of the President’s
Commission. Over the protests of the farm associations, but with
34. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 360, 906-908; Pt. 2, p. 1073;
U.S., Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Marketing Service,
The Hired Farm Working Force of 1956, Agricultural Information
Bulletin 187 (Washington: Department of Agriculture, 1958), pp.
45-50; Second President’s Committee Report, 1960, pp. 23-24; Interview with W. R. Cole, Jr., Florida Farm Placement Service, January 24, 1961; Koos, op. cit., 33.
35. President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, Migratory Labor in
American Agriculture, Report (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1951), 177-185; for representative examples of comment on
t h i s r e p o r t ( t o b e c i t e d h e r e a f t e r a s t h e P r e s i d e n t ’s C o m m i s s i o n
Report) see Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 18, 825-827.
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the support of such varied organizations as the YWCA, PTA,
National Consumers’ League, Disabled American Veterans, and
the many church, labor, and welfare groups which had backed
the migrants all along, the amendments were added and the bill
was sent over to face the wrath of the House Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry. There the Douglas amendments were
torn from the bill and it was thrown back to the Senate, which
passed it the form desired. Since the President, as usual, was
faced with the choice of the status quo or nothing at all, he
signed the bill. 36
The next year saw the periodic tussle begin again. This time
hearings were held before the Senate Subcommittee on Labor
and Labor-Management Relations. The resulting arsenal of facts
revealed that despite improvements in the status of the migrants,
much of their condition remained almost unbelievably deplorable.
Witnesses testified that during winter freezes many Florida migrants still had to beg or starve. Not too far from the decent housing around Lake Okeechobee, a sanitarian discovered 180 people
living in a sixty-room camp with only one so-called toilet, and in
a neighboring camp found forty-eight infants, two of which later
died, stacked like cordwood on two “beds” while their parents, unaware, worked in the fields. The director of the Palm Beach County Health Department testified that many migrant shelters in the
rich resort county were hygienically unfit for cattle; another
Florida health official told of a migrant child stricken with acute
appendicitis who was rushed to a local hospital by the county
sheriff, only to be refused admittance until the quick-thinking
sheriff raised a sufficient sum of money by passing the hat among
the irresponsible revelers at a nearby “juke joint.” 37 Witnesses at
the hearings were also concerned with the consequences of the
lack of union organization among the migrants, a lack partly attributable to the exclusion of farm labor from the collective-bargaining guarantees of the National Labor Relations Act. The following
36. Hasiwar, op. cit., 17; A. R. Issler, “Latest Report on the Joads,”
Survey, LXXXVII (July, 1951), 318-321; Lloyd Fisher, The Harvest
Labor Market in California (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1953), 144. Fisher’s book is one of the very best treatments
of the economics of the harvest labor question, and it is not limited
to California in validity by any means.
37. The incidents mentioned in the body of this article are not exceptional or overemphasized; see the testimony of any public health or
housing officials given in Migratory Labor Hearings, for example,
Pt. 1, pp. 11, 217-218, 410, 416, 449; Pt. 2, pp. 1039, 1040-1041.
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revealing exchange took place between ex-economics professor
Douglas and a former official of the F.S.A.:
Senator DOUGLAS. . . . Farm workers are not organized.
The Department of Labor will pay attention to the needs of
industrial workers because if they do not the unions will turn
the heat on them. But they can neglect the agricultural
workers and throw them overboard because there is no corresponding organization of the farm workers. That is brutal
language, but is not that the reality?
Mr. HUDGENS. Yes, sir. I think that is true. 38
In the face of testimony such as that which led to Douglas’
observation, many organizations joined to second the recommendation of the President’s Commission that migrants be extended the protection of the National Labor Relations Act. Among
these could be counted not only the AF of L and the CIO but
such other associations as the Methodist Women’s Society of
Christian Service, those liberal small farm owners united in the
National Farmers’ Union, and most of the health and religious
service groups that previously had been active. 39
The buzz of interest and favorable comment aroused by the
hearings proved to have little effect upon the action of Congress.
Despite a Senate provison that bills affecting farm labor were
to be referred to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare,
the farm labor program was once again tossed to the Committee
on Agriculture, where farm bloc lobbyists swarmed over it like
ants on a picnic. One of their spokesmen declared that he saw
no need for concern over the migrants, who “weren’t depressed
as compared with the standards of living of most of the people
of the world.” Farm bloc representatives now repeated to friendlier ears statements similar to those they had made during the
earlier hearings. A spokesman for the National Grange had then
remarked in wide-eyed innocence that “the inference here seems to
38. Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, p. 715.
39. League for Industrial Democracy, Down on the Farm: the Plight of
Agricultural Labor (New York: League for Industrial Democracy,
1955), 13ff.; President’s Commission Report, 114-117; James Myers,
“The Continuing Farm Migrant Scandal,” Socialist Call, XXV (August, 1957), 10; W. P. Tucker, “Populism up to Date: The Story of
The National Farmers' Union,” Agricultural History, XXI (1947),
205-207; Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. 348-359, 699-704,
901; William Green, “Our Own Forgotten People,” American Federationist, LVII (December, 1950), 20-22, 30.
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be that farmers are, or may, exploit workers. . . . Each worker
has the free choice of working wherever and for whomever he
pleases and at a wage that is acceptable to him.” And a member
of a Florida growers’ association declared that the proposals to
grant migrants the same guarantees that most non-farm workers
had enjoyed for years came from “theorists and persons who
would lead this Nation down the road to state socialism.” The
predictable result of all this was that once again the farm labor
program went through without any amendments on labor standards. 40 Later in the same session Senator Humphrey attempted
to have a Federal Committee on Migratory Labor established, but
Florida’s Senator Spessard Holland immediately killed the Humphrey bill by objection. 4 1 Holland’s vigilance was circumvented in
1954, however, for in that year President Eisenhower established a similar committee by executive order. 42
It was also in 1954 that the Department of Health, Education and Welfare decided that it, at least, had had enough
of the continual scandals over migrant misery; the Department
called a conference of representatives of all the Atlantic coast
states’ public health agencies and insisted that changes be made.
Within a year the Department’s Public Health Service could list
health facilities for migrants in almost every county along the
Atlantic seaboard. The new campaign apparently bore fruit; by
1957 a Public Health survey of Florida migrants found no
appreciable difference between the health of migrants and that
of any other group. 43
President Eisenhoswer’s Committee on Migratory Labor presented its first report in 1956, having been instructed to “assume
national leadership in improving the social and economic welfare
of our domestic and migratory farm workers.” Thus hailed in
40. I. Begeman, “Sweatshops on the Farm,” New Republic, July 30,
1951, p. 17; the quoted statements, and many others similar in tone
and viewpoint, are found in Migratory Labor Hearings, Pt. 1, pp. ii,
350, 482, 495, 515, 886, 891.
41. Congressional Record, 82nd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1952, XCVIII, Pt.
7, p. 9061.
42. U.S., President’s Committee on Migratory Labor, [First] Report to
the President on Domestic Migratory Labor (Was h i ngton: Department of Labor, 1956), 1.
43. Berman, p. 9; U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Guide to Some Key Sources of Health
Service or Information in Major Migrant Work Areas of the East
Coast (Washington: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1955); Koos, op. cit., 20.
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ringing tones, the report proved to be a masterpiece of egg-treading delicacy. It pussyfooted through several harmless recommendations such as “Farm employers should be encouraged to improve
labor-management practices and relations”; the only one of its
proposals which could conceivably have been of any direct aid
to migrants, or could possibly have cost growers a cent, was
one which sought the erection of improved housing-and immediately after making this request the committee hastened to
soften the blow by including as a major portion of its report a
complete section on how such housing expenses could be deducted
from the farm owner’s income tax. 44
In Florida there was no great rush of farm owners to claim
tax deductions for constructing housing. Indeed, enough growers
were satisfied with their existing tax deductions to cause a fresh
housing scandal in the unusually cold winter of 1958. Reports of
migrants freezing and starving in the Immokalee area of the
Everglades set off a wave of demands by shocked newspapermen,
led by Pulitzer Prize winner Howard Van Smith of the Miami
Daily News, that something be done. The public outcry brought
a personal visit and prompt action by Governor Leroy Collins.
As a result of Collins’ tour State Representative Emmett Roberts
of Palm Beach County was named to head a fact-finding committee to recommend needed legislation. Roberts’ committee had
plans for low-cost housing drawn up and even succeeded in
pushing a bill for camp licensing and inspection through the
1959 Florida State Legislature. But the officer placed in charge
of the inspection program later expressed his intention to move
with caution, avoiding “revolutionary changes.” 45
Another promising step was made early in 1959 when
Secretary of Labor James Mitchell proposed that the Farm Placement Service no longer supply migrant workers to farm enterprises where minimum labor standards were not met. Mitchell
backed up his threat by scheduling hearings for the coming
summer for the purpose of setting up an appropriate code of
standards. Within a month a number of Congressmen had protested to Mitchell that his proposals were “illlegal, impractical,
44. First President’s Committee Report, 2-4, Exhibit C, and passim.
45. Tampa Tribune, April 14, 1959, p. 1-B; July 10, 1959, p. 12-A;
Norman Thomas, “What Is Florida Doing About Migrant Housing?”
All-Florida Weekly Magazine, January 18, 1959, pp. 8, 14; Emmett
S. Roberts, unpublished letter to the author, June 23, 1959.
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and immoral.” But soon thereafter another band of Congressmen
headed by Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota came to the
aid of the Secretary of Labor with a public statement attacking
those whom they accused of attempting to call off the proposed
hearings. Only three Senators and six Representatives from
Atlantic coast states signed the McCarthy statement, however;
none of the Florida delegation signed. 46 The hearings took place
in September, 1959, and resulted in action along the lines
Mitchell had suggested. No uniform Federal code of minimum
standards was set, however; instead, the wage standard was to be
that “prevailing in the area,” and housing, other than being
“hygienic and adequate to the climatic conditions,” had only to
conform to whatever the state or local code might provide. In
Florida, this meant that housing had to conform to the 1959
code enacted as a result of the uproar following the Immokalee
freezes. The standard of migrant housing leaped forward spectacularly: “We’re all a little lazy until somebody calls something
to our attention,” commented W. F. Cole of the Florida Farm
Placement Service. 47 The rigor of housing inspection still varied
a great deal; moreover, Charles Goodlett, police chief of Belle
Glade, declared to a nationwide television audience in late 1960
that housing there was still insufficient at the height of the season.
There had been strong opposition to the showing of the television documentary film in which Goodlett spoke, just as there had
been protests against the holding of Mitchell’s hearings. Reportedly, the Florida Citrus Commission had threatened to bring suit
against both the Columbia Broadcasting System and Philip Morris
Cigarettes, which sponsored the show, should it actually go on the
air. 48
“Labor Unit Hopes to Better Conditions For Farm Workers,” Washington Daily News, February 3, 1959, p. 21; Eugene McCarthy et al.,
“Public Hearings on Farm Workers,” mimeographed statement
(Washington: 1959); Associated Press dispatch, June 7, 1959, in
Tampa Tribune, same date, 1.
47. U.S., Department of Labor, news release, “Secretary Mitchell Issues
Farm Worker Recruitment Regulations,” Washington, November 20,
1959; Interview with W. F. Cole, Jr., Florida Farm Placement Service, January 24, 1961.
48. Columbia Broadcasting System documentary film, “Harvest of
Shame,” Edward R. Murrow, narrator, November 24, 1960, was the
show on which Goodlett and other Floridians spoke. On the threatened suit and other opposition see any Florida newspaper for the week
preceding the broadcast, for example, Gainesville Sun, November 24,
1960.

46.
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In the same year, President Eisenhower’s Committee on
Migratory Labor brought out a second report, which was considerably more constructive than the first. Led by Secretary
Mitchell, the committee reminded President Eisenhower of a
speech in which he had expressed concern about “the denial to
some of our citizens of equal protection under the law,” and
pointed out that the plight of migratory farm workers furnished
a striking example of such denial. But the only major Federal
action recommended by the committee was passage of legislation
to protect migrants from crew leader abuses. For the rest, they
were content to urge state action, even though the spottiness and
unreliability of such an approach was indicated in parts of their
own report. Representative Harrison Williams of New Jersey,
chairman of the House Subcommittee on Migrant Workers,
publicly expressed his feeling that the great over-representation of
farm interests in state legislatures would prevent the success of
the state-by-state attack. 4 9 This remains to be seen, but perhaps
past experience can aid those who wish to make predictions.
For years to come, the slowly diminishing migrant stream
will flow annually from Florida as the crops of the Atlantic seaboard ripen in their due progression. We may expect that some
day the continued development of harvesting machines will make
the repetitive and arduous labor of the migrant unnecessary; we
also may hope that a more humane and conscientious America
will have helped train the migrants and their children for more
rewarding and permanent employment. Let the progress of the
immediate future come with what speed it will, the principle
that the national government can fix standards for the migrants
is nevertheless established. But when these national standards
are not high and firmly maintained, experience has shown the
sad results. We have long accepted the idea of Federal regulation
of our interstate waterways; is it less important to control a human stream and put it to use? The past gave its own answer; let
the future reply.

49.

Second President’s Committee Report, 4 , 5, 14, 18, 32-33. Williams
spoke on the same television program mentioned above.
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